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The Electorate as More Than Afterthought
James Samplet

INTRODUCTION

Warren Buffett, in a Fortune Magazine article that became
an instant classic in the world of finance, wrote that "when very
human politicians choose between the next election and the next
generation, it's clear what usually happens." Unfortunately, in
the context of election laws, the Oracle of Omaha's comments
apply a fortiori. That is to say-to borrow Mr. Buffett's
framing-when very human politicians craft election laws, as
between
self-interested partisan ends
and high-minded
democratic values, it's usually clear what happens.
This article focuses on a few specific election law proposals
in which voters qua voters would be the principal beneficiaries.
The approach of the paper is to emphasize election law changes
in which the pro-electorate characteristics of the proposals are
the key criteria, rather than any partisan distributional gains.
Pro-electorate is defined, for purposes of the paper, as favorable
to voter participation, favorable to the electorate's increased
participation being meaningful; and is specifically intended to be
measured without regard to partisanship. In addition to policy
ramifications,
the article explores notable recent legal
developments in connection with the proposals, including, in
particular, the ramifications of pertinent court decisions arising
out of litigation connected to the 2014 midterm elections.
The election law initiatives explored in the article include
both ambitious proposals (for example, expanding early voting,
no-fault absentee balloting, same-day registration, and, most
ambitiously, state adoption of the national popular vote
compact) and more marginal changes (for example, eliminating
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University of Chicago Legal Forum and to my fellow participants in the associated
symposium for their comments and suggestions. Student research assistants Peter
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the highly counter-majoritarian practice of empowering a single
U.S. Senator to "blue-slip" a judicial nominee, and rolling back
state-specific felon disenfranchisement laws). The article
intentionally excludes particularly partisan and tendentious
election law topics such as redistricting methodology,
controversies surrounding present-day applications of the Voting
Rights Act, and broad questions of campaign finance regulation,
to instead focus on the selected initiatives, precisely for their
electorate-centric qualities. While any changes in election law
are inherently subject to politicization, the paper attempts to
take a partisan-blind approach to analyzing the potential of the
proposals to further the values inherent in a republican form
of government.
The article proceeds in four parts, each of which focuses on
one specific change that, whether standing alone or in concert
with the other proposals considered in the paper, would
ultimately redound to the benefit of the electorate writ large.
Part I advocates for the restoration of voting rights to
individuals who, due to felony convictions, have been subjected
to disenfranchisement. Part II explores several micro-proposals
involving the expansion of access to the polls. Part III addresses,
albeit briefly for a topic of such scope, the National Popular Vote
Compact. Finally, Part IV addresses the United States Senate's
blue-slip tradition, recognizing that representative governance
may just as significantly be undermined by practices as opposed
to laws.
I.

ROLLING BACK FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT

In the year 2000, George W. Bush became the forty-third
President of the United States in one of the most divisive
elections in American history. Vice-President Al Gore won the
popular vote, but George W. Bush won the electoral vote, and
therefore the Presidency.' The election brought to the fore many
issues with the voting system in the United States. 2 Given that

1 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contradiction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisementin the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 777,
792 (Dec. 2002).
2 William Walton Liles, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Past,
Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 615 (2007) ("In 2000, over 4.5 million
Americans, which is over two percent of the country's voting-age population, were
prohibited from voting because of disenfranchisement laws.").
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the 2000 election came down to the electoral votes of Florida, 3 a
state with some of the strictest felon disenfranchising laws in
the country,4 many people believe that, had Florida's
disenfranchised felons been able to vote, Al Gore would have
become the forty-third President of the United States.5
Moreover, felon disenfranchisement laws have "likely affected
the results of seven U.S. Senate races."6 Given the political
felon
of
drawbacks
the
law,
election
of
nature
disenfranchisement are often emphasized by Democrats.' In
recent years, however, some leading Republicans have
supported the restoration of voting rights to at least some
individuals with felony convictions.8
While felon disenfranchisement laws can be traced back to
the colonies, where the laws were mostly limited to "offenses
related to voting or considered 'egregious violations of the moral
code,"' they picked up steam in the years following the Civil
War.9 Southern states saw disenfranchisement as a way of
denying African Americans the vote, "and as a means of
curtailing the rights they had gained after the Civil War."10
Many states tailored their disenfranchisement laws to include
offenses they believed were more typically committed by African

3 Id.
See Christopher Uggen et al., State-Level Estimates of Felon Disenfranchisement
in the United States, 2010, (The Sentencing Project July 2012), available at
Disen
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fdStateLevelEstimatesofFelon_
felon
the
(discussing
http://perma.cc/XZ9C-5LKW
archived at
2010.pdf,
disenfranchisement laws across the United States and the effects of those laws).
5 George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement:Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 851 (2005); Uggen, Democratic Contradiction?, supra note 1, at
792; Liles, supra note 2, at 615 (stating that the election in Florida was decided by less
than 1,000 votes, and "in Florida alone, there were as many as 620,000 citizens
prohibited from voting because of felony disenfranchisement laws").
6 Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, 5 (The Sentencing Project
http: //www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
at
available
2014),
April
archived at http://perma.cc/J3TZfdFelony%20Disenfranchisement%20Primer.pdf,
KQDN. See Uggen, Democratic Contradiction?,supra note 1, at 794.
See Marc Meredity & Michael Morse, Do Voting Rights Notification Laws
Increase Ex-Felon Turnout?, ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 220, 222 (2014),
availableat http: /www.sas.upenn.edu/-marcmere/ workingpapers/FelonNotification.pdf.
8 See Leon Neyfakh, Why Can't Ex-Cons Vote? (Mar. 17, 2015), available at
http: //www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/crime/2015/03/why-can-t ex cons-vote
the-surprisinglyComplicated-politics-behind felon.html (discussing a Minnesota felon
enfranchisement bill with strong support from Republicans).
9 Chung, supra note 6, at 2.
'0 John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the
Eighth Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 762 (2013).
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Americans." Felon disenfranchisement laws still have a
disproportionate impact on the African American community
today. Currently, one in every thirteen, or 7.7% of black adults is
disenfranchised, as opposed to one in every fifty-six, or 1.8% of
non-black adults. 12 Across the United States, 2.2 million African
Americans have lost their right to vote. 13
Disenfranchisement laws differ across the United States. 14
All states but two, Maine and Vermont, have laws
disenfranchising felons. 15 Three states, Iowa, Florida, and
Kentucky, permanently disenfranchise all people with felony
convictions.16 Another eight states1 7 permanently disenfranchise
some individuals with criminal convictions, unless the
government approves the restoration of voting rights for an
individual.1 8 Four states1 9 restore a felon's right to vote after
they complete their prison sentences and parole, and another
twenty stateS 20 will not restore a felon's voting rights until the
individual has completed both parole and probation. Felons in
thirteen states and the District of Columbia will have their

11

See Chung, supra note 6, at 3.
Id. at 2; Felony DisenfranchisementLaws in the United States, 1 (The Sentencing
Project April 2014),
available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
fdFelony%20Disenfranchisement%2OLaws%20in%20the%20US.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/CY5E-B5KN. In Florida and Kentucky, two of the states with the
strictest disenfranchisement laws, more than one in five black adults have lost the right
to vote. Id.
12

1s

Id. at 1.

Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution gives the states the power to
determine the qualifications that must be met by a person wishing to vote. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2. 'While the right of suffrage is established and guaranteed by the
Constitution it is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not
discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress acting
pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed." Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
15 In Maine and Vermont, even felons still serving sentences in prison are allowed
to vote. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, supra note 12, at 1;
CriminalDisenfranchisementLaws across the United States, Brennan Center for Justice,
available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/RTV%20Map%
2010%2016%2013.pdf, archived at https://perma.cclWJZ4-9ZYN.
16 CriminalDisenfranchisementLaws across the United States, supra note 15.
17 Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, Nevada, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Wyoming. Id.
1s Id.
19 California, Colorado, Connecticut, and New York. Id.
o Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
14
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voting rights automatically restored once they are released
21
from prison.

Because of the dramatic increase in the prison population in
the United States, there has also been a dramatic increase in
the number of felons losing their right to vote. The
disenfranchisement rate in 1976 was 1.17 million but grew to
almost 6 million by 2010.22 In total, nearly six million Americans
have lost their right to vote, 23 and 45% of the entire
disenfranchised population lives in states that permanently
disenfranchise all or some felons. 24
Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws

A.

In Richardson v. Ramirez,25 the United States Supreme
Court held that the disenfranchisement of convicted felons who
had completed their sentences and paroles did not deny them
equal protection. 26 The respondents in Richardson were three
individuals who had been convicted of felonies and had
completed their sentences and paroles. All three individuals
applied to register to vote, and the county clerks in the counties
where they wished to register refused to let them because of
their prior felony convictions. 27 The respondents filed a petition
for writ of mandate in the California Supreme Court, and
argued that the section 28 at issue in the California Constitution
of
the
Clause
Protection
the
Equal
violated
Fourteenth Amendment. 29
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and the District of
Columbia. Id.
22
Chung, supra note 6, at 3.
23 The Editorial Board, 6 Million Americans Without a Voice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11,
2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/opinion/6-million-americanswithout-a-voice.html, archived at http://perma.cc/47PE-J3MJ.
24
Chung, supra note 6, at 1.
25 418 U.S. 24 (1974)
26
See generally id.
27
Id. at 32.
28
The section of the California Constitution at issue stated that, "'laws shall be
made' to exclude from voting persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance
in office, 'or other high crimes."' Id. at 27. The California Constitution further provided
that, "no alien, ineligible to citizenship ... no person convicted of any infamous crime,
[and] no person hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public
money ... shall ever exercise the privilege of an elector in this State. Id. at 27-28.
29 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 33; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The California Supreme
Court agreed with the respondents, and held that the "State's denial of the franchise to
21
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The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Equal
Protection argument and held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitutiono "has an
affirmative sanction" for the disenfranchisement of felons. 31
"[W]e may rest on the demonstrably sound proposition that § 1,
in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been
meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was
expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced
representation
which
§2 imposed for other forms
of disenfranchisement." 32
In Hunter v. Underwood,33 the Supreme Court revisited the
issue of felon disenfranchisement. 3 4 In Hunter, the issue was the
constitutionality of the Alabama Constitution which provided for
"the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of, among other
offenses, 'any crime . .. involving moral turpitude."' 35 Two
individuals, one black and one white, were unable to register to
vote in Alabama because both had been convicted of presenting
a worthless check, a misdemeanor that was deemed a crime
involving moral turpitude. 36 The District Court of Alabama
"certified a plaintiff class of persons who have been purged from
the voting rolls or barred from registering to vote in Alabama
solely because of a misdemeanor conviction." 37 The plaintiffs
claimed that the "misdemeanors encompassed within [the
Alabama
Constitution]
were
intentionally
adopted
to
disenfranchise blacks on account of their race and that their
the class of ex-felons could no longer withstand strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause." Liles, supra note 2, at 619.
so "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each States,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twentyone years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participationin rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2
(emphasis added).
at Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
3 Id. at 55.
3
471 U.S. 222 (1985).
34 See generally id.
3
Id. at 223.
36 Id. at 224.
3
Hunter, 471 U.S. at 224.
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inclusion in [the Alabama Constitution had] the intended
effect." 38 The Alabama District Court found that, although the
disenfranchisement of blacks was a motivation behind the
Alabama Constitution section in dispute, it was not a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but the Court of Appeals reversed. 39 The Court of Appeals
believed, and the United States Supreme Court agreed, that:
To establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
the face of mixed motives, plaintiffs must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination
was a substantial motivating factor in the adoption of
[the section at issue]. They shall then prevail unless the
registrars prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the same decision would have resulted had the
impermissible purpose not been considered.40
In upholding the Court of Appeals decision, the United
States Supreme Court noted that, while the section of the
Alabama State Constitution was racially neutral on its face,
after only two years of the enactment, ten times as many blacks
had been disenfranchised than whites. "Official action will not
be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact . . . Proof of racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."4 1 The
Supreme Court held that because the section's "original
enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against
blacks on account of race," and the section continued to have
that effect, it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 42
Following Hunter, it seemed clear that state constitutions or
legislation disenfranchising felons enacted with a discriminatory
purpose violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, there are circuits that disagree. For
example, in Johnson v. Governor of the State of Florida,43 the

38

Id.

Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225 (quoting Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1984)).
41
Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227-28 (quoting Vill. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)).
'

40

42

Id. at 232.

4

405 F.3d 1214 (2005).
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Eleventh Circuit evaluated the felony disenfranchisement
provision
of Florida's
Constitution. 4 4 Under
Florida's
Constitution, a person convicted of a felony who has completed
their prison sentence, probation, and parole can only regain
their right to vote if Florida's Clemency Board grants him
clemency. 45 The plaintiffs in Johnson filed a class action on
behalf of all of Florida's disenfranchised felons. 4 6 They argued
that the disenfranchising law was created because of a racial
motivation and was therefore a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 4 7 In 1868, Florida was required to revise its Constitution
in order to be readmitted to the Union. The 1868 Constitution
contained the disenfranchising provision. In 1968, Florida again
revised their Constitution, and again the Constitution contained
a felony disenfranchisement provision. Plaintiffs argued that the
1868 Constitution's provision was motivated by racially
discriminatory goals. While the Eleventh Circuit assumed that
the plaintiffs were correct about the 1868 Constitution, 4 8 the
court upheld the disenfranchisement provision and affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment because the 1968
Constitution was not enacted based on discriminatory intent. 49
The court noted that "the current Florida provision was passed
one hundred years after the alleged intentional discrimination
occurred," and, clearly, none of the legislatures who passed the
1968 provision were the same as those who passed the 1868
provision.5 0 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case
therefore leaving open the question of the proper way for lower
courts to evaluate legislation tainted by enactment based on a

" The felony disenfranchisement provision provides that, "[n]o person convicted of a
felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be
qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability."
FLA. CONST. art.VI, § 4 (amended 1968).
45 405 F.3d at 1216 n. 1 (citing FLA. STAT. § 940 (2003)).
46 Id. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 1217.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision, but then the Eleventh Circuit
vacated that opinion and granted a rehearing en banc. Id.
4 Id. at 1217.
48
The Eleventh Circuit was not convinced that the earlier Constitution's provision
was motivated by race, but, because the case was on appeal, they assumed, without
deciding, that it was motivated by race. The Court looked at the facts most favourable to
the Plaintiffs. Id. at 1223.
4
Id. The plaintiffs in Governor of the State of Florida conceded that there was no
racially discriminatory intent behind on the 1968 Constitution. Id.
* Governor of the State of Florida, 405 F.3d at 1225-1226.
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discriminatory motivation. 5 1 Johnson highlights a pattern of
disagreement in the circuits about how courts should evaluate
legislation that has been reenacted after the original legislation
was motivated by discriminatory intent. 52
Recent Policy Changes on Felon Disenfranchisement

B.

There has been a recent movement towards restoring this
right to vote. 53 Since 2000, Connecticut and Kansas have
extended the right to felons on probation, Delaware and
Nebraska repealed their lifetime ban on all felons, and Wyoming
restored the rights of first-time non-violent offenders. 54 These
changes to state laws have led to an estimated 800,000 felons
regaining the right to vote.55 Recent research has shown that
80% of Americans are in favor of restoring the voting rights of
felons who have completed their sentences, and almost two
thirds of Americans favor restoring the rights of felons who are
on probation or parole.5 6 The United States is the only Western
country that disenfranchises individuals once they have
completed their prison sentences.5 7 Most Western countries
allow all incarcerated felons to vote, some impose restrictions for
a limited period of time on prisoners serving lengthy sentences,
and a small number restrict all prisoners from voting, but in
every country, the felon's right to vote is immediately restored at
58
the end of the prison sentence.
Unfortunately, not all policy changes reflect a desire to
restore a felon's right to vote. In 2007, the then Governor of
Florida, Republican Charlie Crist, issued an executive order
expanding voting rights to nonviolent felony offenders.59 Crist

Johnson v. Bush, 546 U.S. 1015, 1015 (2005) (denying certiorari).
See also Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 168 (2010) (holding that New York's
felony disenfranchisement laws and constitutional provisions did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because the amendments and revisions to the laws were not enacted
with discriminatory intent even though previous versions of the laws were).
53 "Since 1997, 23 states have modified felony disenfranchisement provisions to
expand voter eligibility." Chung, supranote 6, at 4.
54 Id. For a complete list of policy changes across the country, see id.; Felony
DisenfranchisementLaws in the United States, supranote 12, at 2-3.
55 Chung, supra note 6, at 4.
"

52

5
6'

5
5

Id.
Ghaelian, supra note 10, at 790.
Id.
Susan Greenbaum, Restoring Voting Rights to Ex-Felons, ALJAZEERA.COM (Feb.
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remained in office for three years, and during that time almost
150,000 felons had their right to vote restored. A 2011 study
conducted by the Florida Parole Commission found that the rate
of recidivism among the felons whose rights had been restored
was 33% lower than the rate of those who did not. Although the
order was a positive step and seemed to have a beneficial effect,
when the new Governor, Rick Scott, took office, he rescinded
Crist's order and imposed stricter regulations. 60 Under the new
restrictions imposed by Scott, a felon must wait between five
and seven years after completing their sentence, including
prison time, parole and probation, before they may apply for the
restoration of their voting rights. 61 Then, the application
processing could take up to six years. 62 Even after the possible
eleven-year wait, the felon's chances of regaining his right to
vote is estimated to be less than 1%.63 Currently, Florida's rate
of disenfranchisement is the highest in the country, and over
10% of Florida's voting age population has lost their right to
the Democratic
vote. 64 More recently, Kathy Castor,
Representative from Tampa, reached out to former Attorney
General Eric Holder seeking an investigation of Florida's
the
said
"Castor
laws. 6 5
disenfranchisement
[disenfranchisement] process is now 'intentionally timeconsuming and expensive,' 'serves no rational purpose', and
'harkens back to the Jim Crow era of discrimination.' 6 6 Castor
argued that the restrictions violate due process. 67 Presently,

/

24, 2014), available at http://america.aljazeera.comlopinions/2014/2/voting-rightsarchived at http: //perma.cc
felondisenfranchisementericholdercriminaljustice.html,
3WYZ-QDXK.
60

Id.

Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, Brennan Center for Justice (Mar.
13, 2014), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restorationefforts-florida, archived at http://perma.cc/P6LH-323D; Shoschannah Sayers, Let My
People Vote - The Battle to End FL Felon Disenfranchisement, South Coalition for Social
Justice (Mar. 21, 2014), available at https://www.southerncoalition.org/let-my-peoplearchived at https://perma.cc/3PAZvote-the-battle-to-end-felon-disenfranchisement/,
GCPM.
62 Sayers, supra note 61.
6 Id.
6
Voting Rights RestorationEfforts in Florida,supra note 61.
66
William March, Castor Asks Federal Investigation of Florida "Bar" on Rights
Restoration, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE (Sept. 30, 2014), available at http://tbo.com/news/
blogs/fresh-squeezed-politics/castor-asks-federal-investigation-of-florida-bar-on-rightsrestoration-20140930/, archivedat http://perma.cc/4MUE-QD5U.
66 Id.
6'

67

id.
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felon

disenfranchisement laws in the country.

As in Florida, Iowa has enacted stricter restrictions on the
restoration of voting rights to felons. In 2011, Governor Terry
Branstad took office and issued an executive order requiring
felons to apply to have their voting rights restored. 68 Along with
the application, felons are required to submit a credit report.6 9
Critics of the restrictions say, "Iowa's process disenfranchises
the poor, who don't have money to pay off debts ...

[and]

requiring a credit report is likely scaring off felons with financial
problems."7 0 In 2012, after only a year of the stricter restrictions,
eight thousand felons in Iowa had completed their sentences, yet
less than twelve have had their voting rights restored.7 1
The Future of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws

C.

In February 2014, former Attorney General Eric Holder
gave a speech urging states to restore the voting rights of
felons. 72 Holder argued that, "[b]y perpetuating the stigma and
isolation imposed on formerly incarcerated individuals, these
laws increase the likelihood they will commit future crimes."73
While the Attorney General does not have the authority to enact
laws to expand the restoration of felon's voting rights, his belief
is one that is gaining bipartisan support. Republican Senators
Rand Paul of Kentucky and Mike Lee of Utah, are interested in
expanding voting rights by lessening or repealing restrictions. 74
Senator Paul, who opposes his own State's laws, stated that,
"the punishment and stigma continues for the rest of their life;
harming their families and hampering their ability to re-enter
society." 75 In June, Senator Paul introduced the Civil Rights

Ryan J. Foley, Iowa Felons' Voting Rights: Terry Brandstad Executive Order
Disenfranchises Thousands, HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2012), available at
http: lwww.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/24/iowa-felons-voting-rights-terry-branstad-n
1622742.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L5T5-377W.
68

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

Matt Apuzzo, Holder Urges States to Lift Bans on Felons Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
11, 2014), available at http: lwww.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/politics/holder-urgesstates-to-repeal-bans-on-voting-by-felons.html, archived at http: /perma.cc/3U33-XXD3.
1
6 Million Americans Without a Voice, supra note 23.
7 Id.
7 Id.
72
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Voting Restoration Act of 2014.76 The Act would restore a felon's
voting rights, in Federal elections, after the felon completed his
prison sentence and completed one year of probation, if the
felony was a nonviolent offense.77
The legislation proposed by Senator Paul is similar to the
Democracy Restoration Act proposed in April 2014. The
Democracy Restoration Act was proposed by Michigan's
Democratic Representative John Conyers, Jr. and the
Democratic Representative from Maryland, Senator Ben
Cardin.7 8 The Democracy Restoration Act seeks to restore the
voting rights of 4.4 million Americans in Federal elections. The
Act would restore the voting rights of all individuals released
from prison or serving probation sentences.79

II.

EXPANDING ACCESS TO THE POLLS

Once, the people who founded the United States of America
waged war against the greatest empire the world has seen for
the freedom to establish a representative government.8 0 When
writing the Constitution, the drafters sought to institute a
government composed of officials selected by the people who
were to be governed.8 1 If the idea of an election is to calculate
the collective opinion of the people being governed, the primary
goal of election laws should be to collect as many of those
people's votes as possible. Simply, when more people vote, the
election process more closely resembles a selection by the people
as a whole, and a truer expression of the country's beliefs
emanates from the political branches.
One key to increased voter participation is access. 82
Theoretically, if it is easier for eligible voters to vote, then more

&

7 See S. 2550, 113th Cong. (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/senate-bill/2550/text.
" See id.
78 Democracy RestorationAct, Brennan Center for Justice (May 16, 2014), available
at http://www.brennancenter.org/legislation/democracy-restoration-act,
archived at
http://perma.cclB3QT-MHV5.
7 Id.
* Pedro De Oliviera, Note, Same Day Voter Registration:Post-Crawford Reform to
Address the Growing Burdens on Lower Income Voters, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
POL'Y 345, 346 (Spring 2009).

81

See id. at 346-47.

In eradicating a durational residency requirement as a precondition of voting in a
presidential election, Congress stressed the importance of access to voting, finding that
lack of access can unconstitutionally "den[y] or abridge [ the inherent ... right of citizens
81
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of those voters will vote. 83 There are numerous methods
available that increase the likelihood of voters casting their
ballots. 84 Nevertheless, perspectives as to where the appropriate
balance of participation and convenience should lie are
increasingly divergent.8 5 This article asserts that given current
technological advances, and in a nation on the verge of its 2 5 0th
anniversary, the trend in many jurisdictions to restrict, rather
than expand, the franchise is, at the very least, anachronistic. It
is time for all jurisdictions to undertake concerted efforts aimed
at implementing voter-friendly election laws.
In analyzing the future of election laws, a number of
preliminary questions must be answered. How does one vote?
Can, and if so, how should this ability be restricted? Why should
it be restricted? When can a voter vote? Why must a voter
register prior to casting a ballot? Can these two functions be
fulfilled simultaneously?
This article first considers the policy goals of elections and
voter participation in the context of registration and time
restrictions on voting. The article proposes adopting early voting
in conjunction with same-day registration to increase voter
participation in a manner that will not overburden local
governments or incur substantial risk of election fraud.
A.

How Easy Should It Be to Vote?

When analyzing election rules restricting voter access, the
pertinent question is how convenient should the government
make the process of fulfilling one's right to vote? "No right is
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live."8 6 The Constitution grants the right to
vote to every free man and woman who is a citizen of the United
States and has attained the age of eighteen.8 7 Since 1787,
to vote for their President." Voting and Elections, 52 U.S.C. § 10502 (a)(1) (2012).
83

FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 260

(1st ed. 1988).
" Wendy Weiser & Erik Opsal, The State of Voting in 2014, 6-7 (Brennan Center
for Justice 2014), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
analysis/State ofVoting.2014.pdf, archived at http: /perma.cc/55R6-HLAE.
85 Id. Instead of uniform protocols, every state has a different collection of election
and registration laws. Id.
8
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
87 U.S. CONST. (multiple
provisions).
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constitutional amendments and laws have extensively increased
the breadth of American suffrage. 8 However, an individual's
possession of this right does not prevent the government from
implementing the procedures by which citizens must cast their
votes.89 The U.S. Constitution empowers the states to pass laws
that allow the state to administer elections. 90 Furthermore, to
maintain the integrity of an election, states must minimize
potential fraud.9 1 The principal goal of an election is to have
eligible voters elect representatives that actually represent the
opinions and values of the people whom they govern. 92 To
accomplish this end, voters should be encouraged and assisted in
participating. Thus, efforts should be made to bring in as many
eligible voters as possible to the polls.
State and federal legislators have recognized the
importance of generating voter turnout. 93 The Voting Rights Act
of 1965,94 and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993
("NVRA"), 95 simplified the registration process and increased
voter access. By enacting the Help America Vote Act 2002
("HAVA"), Congress provided a clear directive to states to
modernize their election and registration policies and protocol. 96
Two methods of increasing voter access and easing the election
process are same day Registration and early voting. 97 A number

88

U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.

89 Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.

330, 349 (1971)). "A person does not have a federal constitutional right to walk up to a
voting place on Election Day and demand a ballot." Id. "While the right of suffrage is
established and guaranteed by the Constitution it is subject to the imposition of state
standards which are not discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that
Congress acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed." Lassiter, 360 U.S.
at 51.
9o "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of choosing Senators." U.S. CONST., art.I, §4, cl. 1.
9' Election fraud can manifest itself in the form of single voters casting multiple
votes or ineligible voters accessing the polls.
New Pressures
92 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation:
for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 644 (2008).
9
Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARv. J. LEGIS. 265, 265
(2007).
9 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973-1973aa-6.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq.
96 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252 (H.R. 3295) (Oct. 29, 2002)
7th Congress.
10
97 There are a number of other methods relaxing election and registration policies
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of states have already implemented each of these procedures,
and, while causation is impossible to establish, the changes
seemingly result in increased voter participation.
B.

Registration

American voting is a two-step process: registering and then
casting a ballot.9 8 A prospective voter must both actively seek
inclusion and satisfy the registration conditions. Registration
requires that an individual is (1) eighteen years old at the time
of the next election, (2) a U.S. citizen, and (3) a resident of the
jurisdiction where registering.9 9 Supporters point to registration
as an effective method of collecting important administrative
data,10 0 avoiding confusion on Election Day, and reducing the
threat of election fraud.10 1 The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that states have a legitimate interest in establishing adequate
voter records and preventing voter fraud. 102 However,
preregistration laws inherently limit certain people's ability to
vote, and thus restrict their right to do so. 10 3
Registration originally served to disenfranchise foreigners
and transient people in the early 1800S. 104 Later, most
jurisdictions adopted registration systems to avoid the conflicts
between disenfranchised people and election officials.10 5 By the
late 1900s, registration had become more complex than actual

that have been implemented throughout the states. Weiser & Opsal, supra note 84, at 67.
9 R. Michael Alvarez et al., How Hard Can it Be: Do Citizens Think it is Difficult
to
Register to Vote?, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 382, 383 (2007). Every state other than North
Dakota requires some form of registration before an individual can vote. Id.
9 Issues: Voter Registration, Election Protection, available at http://www.
866ourvote.org/issues/voter-registration.
100
R. Michael Alvarez, Voter Registration: Past, Present, and Future, Written
Testimony Prepared for the Commission on Federal Election Reform 1, 2-3 (June 17,
2005), available at https://www.american.edulspa/cdem/upload/2-alvarez.pdf.
"0 Jay M. Zitter, Validity of Statute Limiting Time Periodfor Voter Registration, 56
A.L.R. 523, 524 (2010).
102
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973) (approving a registration cutoff
date
before Election Day as a way to protect the state's interest). Some courts have accepted
wider limitations as long as the statutes do not preclude an eligible person's right to vote
entirely. See Marston, 410 U.S. at 680; Diaz v. Cobb, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 334 (S.D. Fla.
2008); Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 523 (9th Cir. 1989).
103 Zitter, supra note 101, at 524.
104 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the
United States (2001).
105

Id.
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voting procedures. 106 It had become an insurmountable hurdle
for many who were unable to navigate the systems or who were
uninformed about the requirements.
In enacting NVRA and HAVA, Congress aimed to push back
against the cryptic nature of registration laws. 0 7 By mandating
states offer new registration locations and procedures, these
voter-friendly laws opened new doors to those who were
previously disenfranchised under the old systems. These voterfriendly laws signify the federal government's policy choice to
increase voter participation through more lenient registration
practices. In recent years, however, states have walked back
many of these practices in the name of preventing voter fraud.10 8
C.

Voting Period

In drafting the federal Constitution and creating the
foundations of our political system, the Framers made no
mention of conducting our elections in a single day. 109 Actually,
the Constitution's text has no indication of preferred election
practices. The task of administering federal elections was
expressly left to the states.1 10 A state's ability to establish the
method by which representatives are elected is broad;"' as long
as selected methods conform to all substantive federal election
law, states hold a high level of discretion in choosing
election procedures. 112
106 R. Michael Alvarez et al., How Hard
Can it Be, supra note 98, at 389 (citing
Thomas Quinlivan, One Person, One Vote Revisited: The Impending Necessity of Judicial
Intervention in the Realm of Voter Registration, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2361, 2370 (1989)).
107 Formerly 42 U.S.C. 15482 (2012). HAVA
allows voters to cast provisional ballots
if they claim to be registered voters, but their name does not appear on the ballot. See
State of Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Final Report on the Impacts and
Costs of Eliminating Election Day Registration in Wisconsin (Feb. 18, 2013), available at
http: //gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/65/final edr report 02_18_2013_pdf_8636
8.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7ACB-24PN. Wisconsin's legislature compiled research
on the nature of SDR (referred to as Election Day Registration or EDR) and the
associated costs of discontinuing the practice. Id.
'o Issues: Voter Registration, supra note 99.
109 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §4.

no

Id.

n' U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 311 (1941). "[T]he states are given, and in fact
exercise a wide discretion in the formulation of a system for the choice by the people of
representatives in Congress." Id. at 311.
us Classic, 313 U.S. at 311. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit court has established
federal law does not explicitly preempt Texas early voting statutes. See Voting Integrity
Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 2000).
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A few state constitutions have designated a specific day for
elections to be completed; local courts have interpreted this to
preclude voting procedures on any other day. For example,
Maryland's constitution mandates that all elections shall be held
on the Tuesday after the first Monday of November.113
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that to read a provision
to require an entire election process be completed in a single day
would categorically preempt the practice of absentee balloting,
and therefore cannot be interpreted in that manner.1 14
D.

Recent Election Participation

In the 2012 Presidential Election, only 64% of the eligible
population voted.115 The 2014 midterm elections featured the
lowest voter turnout since World War II, with participation
rates drastically falling in many states from the previous
midterm election.11 6 As of September 10, 2014, approximately
70% of the population were registered to vote.117 The most
common reason most people give for not voting is that they were
too busy or had conflicting schedules.1 18 The second most
common excuse for not participating is illness or disability.1 1 9
Another 9% said they were out of town, while 6% said they had
general registration issues.1 20 There is a direct correlation of
increases in voter turnout percentage to that of increased levels

"
Lamone v. Capozzi, 912 A. 2d 674, (Md. 2006) (holding that an election statute
allowing early voting violated Maryland's state constitution's choice of election day
because the language dictates the day is mandatory).
114
Millsaps v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 535, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2001).
115
Voting Statistics, Statistic Brain, available at http://www.statisticbrain.com/
voting-statistics, archived at http: /perma.cc/NN7G-B6AV.
116 Domenico Montanaro, et al., 2014 Midterm
Election Turnout Lowest in 70 Years,
PBS Newshour (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:06 AM), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
updates/2014-midterm-election-turnout-lowest-in-70-years,
archived at http://perma.
cc/X655-LWSX. Only 36.4 percent of eligible voters took part in the 2014 elections. Id.
Compared to the 2010 midterm elections, fourteen states indicated slight increases in
turnout, but every other state reported a decrease in participation. Id. Nine states had
turnout fall by over 20 percent. Id.
117 There are 206,072,000 eligible voters in the United States, but only 146,311,000
registered American voters. See Voting Statistics, supra note 115.

us

Id.

120 Id.
120

Id.
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of education.121 Similarly, the percentage of voter turnout
steadily increases with the increase in income range.122
Recently a number of states have implemented more
restrictive election protocols. 123 The mid-2000s marked a
noticeable shift towards preventing fraud in lieu of fostering
access. This change in policy towards more restrictive systems,
however, has strained a system that has stripped over two
million people in 2008 of their ability to vote. 124 Fortunately, the
trend towards restriction does not permeate to every state. 125
Since the start of 2013, sixteen states have implemented voter
friendly legislation to increase voter access. 126 Still, the fact that
in 2012, over 35% of the eligible population did not vote shows
that election turnout has significant untapped potential.
E.

Adopting Methods Targeting Increased Voter Participation

Inherently, effective election processes include a significant
role by state governments in facilitating the casting of votes. 127
Thus, one focal point of efforts to increase voter turnout is
making it easier for citizens to access the polls. 1 28 State
legislatures and advocacy groups have proposed numerous
reforms to election laws with the goal of growing voterturnout.129 Two such measures that have already been

121

Id.

122

Id.
Weiser & Opsal, supra note 84, 2-4.
124 Issues: Voter Registration, supra note 99 (errors
in registration systems deprived
eligible and willing voters).
125
The Editorial Board, Where Voting is Now Easier, N.Y.
TIMES (April 11, 2014),
available at http: /mobile.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/opinion/where-voting-is-now-easier.
html?ref=opinion&_r=2&referrer.
123

126

Id.

See generally Elmendorf, supra note 92 (discussing a balancing
standard to
determine the constitutionality of "electoral mechanisms" implemented by state election
laws). "[R]egulations of the electoral process may be said to burden rights of political
participation." Id. at 654. 'The more cumbersome and difficult an administrative
requirement is for certain citizens to comply with, the more that requirement resembles
a categorical denial of the franchise to the most burdened citizens." Id. at 660-61.
128 See generally
id.
129 See Election Laws and Procedures
Overview, National Conference of State
Legislatures (July 25, 2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/researchlelections-andcampaigns/election-laws-and-procedures-overview.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/
F27S-PA5W.
127
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implemented in a number of states are same-day registration
and early in-person voting. 130
1.

Same-day registration.

Traditional registration systems afford citizens unequal
opportunities to vote. 131 While some jurisdictions justify these
inequities as a trade-off for administrative convenience, sameday registration ("SDR") emphasizes the importance of voter
participation. The premise of SDR, sometimes referred to as
Election Day Registration, is that an eligible voter may come to
the polls on the day of the election without having already
registered within the jurisdiction as a voter, and yet still cast a
legitimate and calculated vote. 132 Federal law requires that
states allow voters to register until at least thirty days before
Election Day, but states may offer registration right up until
Election Day. 13 3 SDR effectively opens up the polls to a number
of citizens who otherwise would be unable to vote. 134
In 1973, Maine became the first state to enact laws that
allowed for same-day registration.13 5 In the state legislature, the
issue was not hotly contested, as the Republican-sponsored bill
featured support from both political parties.13 6 At the time, the
idea was novel, but many states have since adopted same-day
registration laws that have expanded the ability of citizens to

130

National Conference of State Legislatures,

Election Laws and Procedures

Overview, supra note 129.
"'

DENNIS THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN

THE UNITED STATES, 28 (2002) (examining how registration cutoff dates more greatly
affect the poor and uneducated population compared to other citizens).
132
Same Day Voter Registration, National Conference of State Legislatures (May 6,
2014), available at http: //www.ncsl.org/researchlelections-and-campaigns/same-dayregistration.aspx, archived at http://perma.ce/976G-8CQK.
133 Issues: Voter Registration, supra note 99.
134 Craig Leonard Brians & Bernard Grofman, Election Day Registration's
Effect on
U.S. Voter Turnout, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 170 (2001), available at http://www.socsci.
uci.edu/-bgrofman/18%2OBrians-Grofman-Election%20day%20registration's%20effect.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4EGP-GKNZ.
13'
Glenn Davis, History of "Same Day" Voter Registration in Maine, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS (Nov. 5, 2011), available at http://bangordailynews.com/20ll/11/O5/politics/
archived at http://perma.cc/U6L8history-of-same-day-voter-registration-in-maine/,

QAA5.
1,6 One member said, "[I1f we have an opportunity to give some people the right to
vote, there is no reason why we can't." "Same Day" Voter Registration in Maine, supra
note 135.
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cast their vote. 137 Ten states and the District of Columbia offer
SDR, but most other states continue to impose a registration
deadline prior to Election Day. 138
Voters may be unable to register in the months leading up
to an election for a variety of reasons, such as complications with
registration process, moving, or misunderstanding. 139 For
citizens of districts that do not permit SDR, once the preElection Day registration deadline has passed, the opportunity
to vote is lost. SDR mitigates the issue of disenfranchisement for
late registrants. However, when considering registration policy,
states must consider the effect on fraud prevention and
logistical issues. 140
One of the challenges of effectively implementing SDR is
averting potential fraudulent voter activity. 14 1 States that offer
SDR still must verify the residency of registrants and the
identity of the voters present. 142 While the integrity of an
election is paramount, the seriousness of the threat of fraud
remains unsupported. 143 Typically, concerns of voter fraud
137 "SameDay" Voter Registration, supra note 132.
138 Id. Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana,
New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Washington D.C. offer SDR for all elections and Connecticut
and Rhode Island offer SDR for Presidential elections. Id.
139 See generally Brooke Lierman, Election Day
Registration: Giving All Americans a
Fair Chance to Vote, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 173, 173-74 (2008). See generally Andrea
M. Lee, Don't Save the Date: How More Restrictive State Voter Registration Deadlines
Disenfranchise Minority Movers, 43 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 245 (2010) (minority
voters); Voting Statistics, supra note 115.
140 See generally Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, (Brennan Center for
Justice
2007),
available
at
http: //www.brennancenter.org/sites/default /files/
legacy/The%20Truth%2OAbout% 20Voter%2OFraud.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
F77H-E9CD. See also Elmendorf, supra note 92, at 644 (2008).
141
Lorraine Minnite, The Politics of Voter Fraud 3 (2007), available at
http:A/www.projectvote.org/mages/publications/Policy%20Reports%20and%2OGuides/Pol
itics ofVoter FraudFinal.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9VPA-MYYM.
142
"Same Day Voter" Registration, supra note 132. Each state offering SDR
has a
different method for verifying the address and identity of voters. Id. For address
verification, some states require utility bills or paychecks, while others are satisfied with
another eligible voter vouching for a same-day registrant. Id. For voter identity
verification, some states require photo identification; others do not require an ID with a
photo. Id.
143 Brooke Lierman, supra note 139, at 174; Minnite, , supra
note 141, at 3 (defining
voter fraud as "knowingly and willingly giving false information to establish voter
eligibility, and knowingly and willingly voting illegally or participating in a conspiracy to
encourage illegal voting by others"); Jane Mayer, The Voter Fraud Myth, THE NEW
YORKER (Oct. 29, 2012), available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/10/
29/the-voter-fraud-myth, archived at http://perma.cclBT37-DADN (demonstrating the
fallacies of the fear of voter fraud by showing a lack of documented cases of such issues);
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involve the specter of a single individual casting multiple votes
or ineligible voters casting ballots. 1 44 To illustrate, busloads of
ineligible voters, dropped off at the poll, may potentially swing
the pendulum of the election in their direction, unless there are
adequate methods of verification. This scenario is not entirely
unfathomable, but in practice, such malevolent acts have rarely
been seen. 14 5 In fact, the concern over voter fraud is largely
unsubstantiated. 146 Studies have shown negligible occurrences of
fraud in elections past, including in jurisdictions where SDR was
available. 1 4 7 Nevertheless, states retain a duty to ensure the
election process is not infected with fraudulent behavior, even if
the threat is minimal.1 48
49
An obvious challenge exists in verifying voter eligibility.1
Preregistration statutes necessarily limit some people's right to
50
Some courts accept this limitation as a trade-off for state
vote.o
administrative convenience as long as the statutes do not
preclude an eligible person's right to vote entirely.1 5 1 In order to
register, voters must present documentation verifying identity
and eligibility. 5 2 Furthermore, states offering SDR have a
number of fraud prevention mechanisms in place to impede
Levitt, supra note 140. But see John Fund, James OKeefe Strikes Again, NATIONAL
REVIEW (Oct. 22, 2014), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/390893/
james-okeefe-strikes-again-john-fund, archived at http://perma.ccfl2AD-XY6U.
144 Claire Foster Martin, Block the Vote: How a New Wave of State Election Laws is
Rolling Unevenly Over Voters & the Dilemma of How to Prevent It, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 95,
97 (2013).
14 Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an
Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009);
John Wasik, Voter Fraud: A Massive, Anti-Democratic Deception, FORBES.COM (Nov. 6,
2012), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/11/06/voter-fraud-amassive-anti-democratic-deception, archived at http: //perma.cc/P664-FVG3.
146 Benson, supra note 145, at 2.
146
Levitt, supra note 140; Lierman, supra note 139, at 174; see also Voting Rights
Restoration Efforts in Florida, supra note 61.
147 Levitt, supra note 140 ("[V]oter fraud is extraordinarily rare."); Lierman, supra
note 139, at 174.
148 Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir. 1989).
See Martin, supra note 144, at 98-99; Zitter, supra note 101, at 523.
149
15

Zitter, supra note 101.

151 Id. States accept the following forms of proof to verify residence and eligibility: a
current driver's license or ID card (all SDR states); documents such as a paycheck or
utility bill with an address (some states); or an already-registered voter vouching for the
residency of a registrant (few states). National Conference of State Legislatures, Same
Day Voter Registration,supra note 132.
152
National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Day Voter Registration, supra
note 132. Some states require photo ID, while others accept ID without photo. Id.
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nefarious acts such as fraud in the registration or casting
multiple ballots. 153 Since the risk of the specific types of voter
fraud is statistically minimal, or at least unlikely to have a
profound effect on election results, and methods to verify
eligibility and identity are adequate, states should not avoid
SDR in the name of maintaining election integrity.
The threat of voter fraud, even if more significant than data
seem to indicate, has been elevated as a political and partisan
specter to keep certain voters away from the pollS. 15 4 Each party
will naturally favor voting laws that are most likely to result in
a successful result for own-party candidates.1 55 If fraud is not a
registration laws merely
real issue, more restrictive
disenfranchise parts of the eligible population. 156 More
restrictive registration laws and elections laws have a
disproportionate effect on those with less flexible schedules and
less education.157 Thus, lower economic class citizens and
minorities experience the biggest reductions in voter turnout
with more restrictive voting and registration laws. 15 8
Even if the threat of fraud is not dispositive, jurisdictions
may have secondary reasons disfavoring implementation of
SDR. Key among these secondary reasons are logistical
the physical
in
particular,
including,
considerations,
requirements of labor and locations. 159 When a state adopts
160
SDR, it can expect a larger number of voters to turn out.

Because many of these new voters will need to register as well

153 Id. (e.g., Iowa and New Hampshire use non-forwarding mail sent to each Election
Day registrant-if the mail is undeliverable, the case is forwarded to law enforcement; in
Montana, Election Day registrants unable to fulfill ID requirements vote on a
provisional ballot and later verify identity before the ballot can be counted).
154 Martin, supra note 144, at 98.
1ss Jonathan H. Adler, Will Early Voting Rules in Ohio Produce the next Bush v.
Gore?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 4, 2014), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/04/will-early-voting-rules-inohio-produce-the-next-bush-v-gore, archived at http://perma.cc/LCR5-7X5F.
156

Id.

Lee, supra note 139, at 248.
See Oliviera, supra note 80, at 346
'5 Brian Montopoli, Scott Walker Criticizes Same-day Voter Registration, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 20, 2012), available at http: #www.cbsnews.com/news/scott-walker-criticizes-sameday-voter-registration, archivedat http: /perma.cc/QM4B-QRV6.
'6
Marion Just, Same-Day Voter Registration Would Improve Turnout,
NYTIMES.COM (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2011/11/07/should-voting-in-the-us-be-mandatory-14/same-day-voter-registration-wouldimprove-turnout, archived at http://perma.cc/4QE3-2V68.
158

.
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as vote, the process requires more time than for those voters
who simply cast a ballot.161 Accordingly, lines and waiting times
increase, or, to keep this process both organized and efficient,
more poll workers must be hired and trained. If, however, SDR
expands the franchise, then the resulting cost-benefit analysis is
simply a question of values: do we, as a society, value the
expansion of the franchise more than the cost of the investment?
2.

Early voting.

Federal law establishes the Tuesday following the first
Monday in the month of November as Election Day. 162 Courts
have determined that this federal law does not preclude states
from collecting votes prior to that date. 163 A number of
jurisdictions have enacted laws that allow voters to cast their
ballots in advance of Election Day. 164 Currently, more than half
of the states have adopted Early Voting in some form.165 Early
Voting has proved to be popular in the states in which it is
offered, as longer lines can be avoided and trips to the polls can
be made at convenient times. 166
Early in-person voting ("EIPV") allows voters to come to
actual polling places and cast their votes. 167 Among the many
Montopoli, supra note 159.
2 U.S.C. §7 (2012) (setting the date of the popular election to choose Congress
delegates); 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (setting the popular election for selecting the
representatives who select the President and Vice President).
163 See generally Voting Integrity Project, 199 F.3d;
see Tracy Bateman Farrell,
Validity, Construction, and Application of Early Voting Statutes, 29 A.L.R. 6th 343, 344
(2007).
164
Absentee and Early Voting, National Conference of State Legislatures (Oct. 21.
2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-andearly-voting.aspx, archived at http: /perma.cc/J96T-UNLY.
165
Diana Kasdan, Early Voting: What Works, 1 (Brennan Center for Justice
2013),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/VotingReport
Web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KBE9-DMNU. As of July 2014, thirty-three states
and the District of Colombia offer some form of Early Voting. National Conference of
State Legislatures, Absentee and Early Voting, supra note 164.
166 Susan Lerner, et al., People Love It: Experience With Early Voting In Selected
U.S. Counties, Common Cause/NY & Common Cause Election Prot. Project, 3 (2013)
(hereinafter
common
cause
early
voting
report),
available
at
http://www.commoncause.org/research-reports/people-love-it-experience-with-earlyvoting.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DDD6-Y7E4; Farrell, supra note 162, at 343. In
Tennessee, the number of votes cast during the early voting period comprised over 35%
of the total votes in 2000. Millsaps, 259 F.3d at 541.
167 Kasdan, supra note 165, at 2-3. Another available method for Early Voting is the
early mail-in option. Id. Some mail-in early voting is treated exactly the same as
absentee voting, which is highly scrutinized by election officials in many jurisdictions.
161
162
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benefits, EIPV, at the very least, increases the election's
accessibility to voters. 168 EIPV certainly does not diminish voter
turnout. Because the primary goal of an election is generating
voter participation, EIPV is an effective method at furthering an
election's value. Typically, the key concerns raised regarding
EIPV are the increased costs in polling administration and
campaigns and the lack of a fully-informed decision by early
voters.169 To adopt ElPV is to incur new administrative costs not
present when operating a single-day voting period. Opening
polling places for more days, compensating election officials, and
recruiting volunteers all will push the price of administration
north. 170 EIPV supporters, however, stress that EIPV should not
be adopted as a budget saving measure. 171 Supporters instead
laud the advantages of the program.17 2 Aside from any benefits
to the overall voter participation, EIPV reduces stress on the
voting system on Election Day by relieving the high number of
voters in one day.1 73 Election administrators are less inundated
with people seeking assistance.1 74 Furthermore, voters who can
come to the polls during EIPV are doing so at more convenient

See id. EIPV does not necessarily involve going to a polling place; EIPV may take
different forms. Id.
168 Some argue that EIPV increases voter turnout.
Id. at 5. However, the effect of
Early Voting on turnout is difficult to gauge because there are so many other factors that
also affect turnout, such as candidates' efforts to get-out-the-vote. Id. By offering more
time for citizens to vote, more people will be available to make it to the polls. Id. at 5.
169 Eugene Kontorovich & John McGinnis, The Case Against Early Voting, POLITICO
(Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/earlyvoting-the-case-against-102748.html?hp=rl#.VKXakyvF9bK, archived at http://perma.
cc/J3CZ-FN6H (claiming that despite the benefits of early voting, it "threatens the basic
nature of citizen choice" because of the change of circumstances that are likely to occur
from the onset of an early voting period to the final election day); John Fund, The
Trouble with Early Voting, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2014, 6:00 PM), available
at
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/390669/trouble-early-voting-john-fund,
archived at http://perma.cc/5ELY-L6GE (noting instances where information revealed
close to the final day of election apparently affected the outcome); Glynis Kazanjian,
Early Voting Costs Counties $2.6M,
but Hasn't Increased Turnout Yet,
MARYLANDREPORTER.COM (Sept. 10, 2012), available at http://marylandreporter.com/
2012/09/10/early-voting-costs-counties-2-6m-but-hasnt-increased-turnout-yet,
archived
at http://perma.cc/2JPB-3PE6 (the cost of administering an election increases when
implementing early voting).
10
See Kasdan, supra note 165, at 8.
171
172

Id.
Id. at 5-8.

17 Id. at 5. EIPV also allows for early identification and correction of registration
errors and voting system glitches, and increases voter satisfaction. Id. at 6-7.
174 See Kasdan, supra note 165,
at 6.
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times, so they are more willing to wait in line.17 5 Again, the costbenefit analysis yields a value-laden judgment: do potential, and
perhaps even negligible increases in marginal costs outweigh
the potential increased voter participation? More bluntly, is our
democracy worth this modest investment? The second of the
concerns is that those early voters may not be privy to
information regarding a candidate that is learned after an early
voter has already visited the polls. While such a concern is valid,
no early in-person voter is requiredto vote prior to Election Day,
and the individual, rather than the state, is surely better
positioned to evaluate this risk, and to measure the risk against
the reward of casting a vote-especially a vote they might not be
as able to cast if limited to election day itself.
3.

The pushback against more permissive voting systems.

Voters have seen monumental shifts in their districts over
the past decade with respect to voting law. 176 To the detriment of
a bipartisan goal of increasing overall turnout and education,
Democrats and Republicans have manipulated election laws and
policies to benefit their own candidates.1 7 Many states have
passed laws that decrease participation by restricting voter
178
rights, including cutting back on EIPV and eliminating SDR.
This dissension leads to voter confusion and disenfranchises
eligible voters. 179
In 2014, litigation around the country, and particularly
involving the states of Ohio, North Carolina, Texas and
Wisconsin, highlighted both the nexus of the political and legal
battles over voter access laws. 18 0 The U.S. Supreme Court

Id. at 5-6.
Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars Heat Up: Will the Supreme Court Allow
States to Restrict Voting for PartisanAdvantage? SLATE.COM (Sept. 29, 2014), available
at http: //www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/voting-restric
archived at
tions-may-reachthesupreme-court from ohio wisconsinnorth.html,
http://perma.cc/3GXH-CHZK.
17
Id. Restrictions on the voting population by voter ID laws generally benefits
republican candidates. Id.
171

176

178

Id.

Id.
See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (involving a Texas voter ID law);
Husted v. Ohio State Conference of N.A.A.C.P., 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (involving
amendments to the Ohio Revised Code relating to Ohio's early in-person voting scheme);
North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (involving various
provisions of North Carolina's election reform law); Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014)
17
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mostly has left lower court decisions undisturbed. For example,
in Veasey v. Perry,181 the Supreme Court denied petitioners
application to vacate a stay entered by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals on a Southern District of Texas decision striking down
Texas election law. 182
While the Supreme Court largely has stayed on the
sidelines, it has not done so entirely. Notably, the Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court's refusal to stay an Ohio
district court's order preventing Early Voting cuts before the
2014 mid-term election. 183 Ohio's Senate Bill 238 read in
conjunction with Directive 2014-17 would retain an extensive
Early Voting period, but merely decreased the period by a few
days. 184 The district court applied a balancing test to determine
the plaintiff's likelihood of success in showing the reduction of
early voting violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act and wrongfully disrupted equal
protection.185 The District Court found that "SB 238 and
Directive 2014-17 combine to significantly burden the right to
vote of the enumerated groups."18 6 After balancing the burden
imposed by the measures against the offered justifications, the
Court held "that the offered justifications fail to outweigh the
burdens imposed."18 7 Had the Ohio restrictions been found
unconstitutional, it would have been a significant mark of
approval for voter access, particularly because relative to laws in
other states, Ohio's restrictions were not overly burdensome.18 8
(involving Wisconsin's voter ID law).
181 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014).
182 Id. At trial in the District Court, advocacy groups successfully
argued that Texas'
Voter ID law violated the Voting Rights Act and Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014).
183 See generally Husted, 135 S. Ct.; Rick Hasen,
Breaking: Supreme Court, 5-4,
Blocks Extension of Early Voting in Ohio:Analysis, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Sept. 29, 2014,
1:05 PM), available at http://electionlawblog.orgtp=66036, archived at http://perma.cc/
LQ2F-97PW.
184

Id.

Ohio State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted, 43 F.Supp.3d 808, 844 (S.D. Ohio
2014), aff'd, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Rick Hasen, Breaking: 6"h Circuit
Refuses to Stay Ohio Early Voting Order, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Sept. 12, 2014, 4:20 PM),
available at http://electionlawblog.orgp=65407, archived at http://perma.cc/R3F2RRHY.
186 Ohio State Conference of N.A.A.C.P., 43 F. Supp. 3d, at 843-44, (S.D.
Ohio 2014),
aff'd, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014).
18s

187

Id.

38 Rick Hasen, Breaking News and Analysis: Federal Court Grants Injunction
Restoring Early Voting in Ohio, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Sept. 4, 2014, 7:58 AM), available
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In passing election legislation, states should be primarily
concerned with increasing voter access. To achieve the most
representative election process with the least amount of burden
on the system, jurisdictions should implement both SDR and
EVIP. Doing so would have the effect of allowing voters to vote
to the last minute with SDR, yet would also assuage the
congestion at polls with EVIP.
III. THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE COMPACT

When George W. Bush defeated Al Gore in the 2000
Presidential election, he became the fourth president elected in
American history who failed to win the national popular vote.18 9
Vice President Gore had received 540,000 more votes then
President Bush; however, President Bush won the Electoral
College 271 to 266 and therefore won the presidency.19 0 The race
ultimately came down to four counties in Florida undergoing a
vote recount that the U.S. Supreme Court later held
unconstitutional in the contentious Bush v. Gore.19 1
That controversy brought the intricacies of the curious
Electoral College system into the national discourse and revived
a movement to ensure our president would only win after
receiving the majority of the popular vote.1 92 As Bush v. Gore
demonstrated, the president is technically not elected by a vote
of the people, but by a group of "electors" determined by the
state legislatures.1 9 3 The state legislatures were granted this
constitutional right, and they in turn have enabled or authorized
their respective citizens to cast votes which essentially tell the
states' appointed electors how their official vote shall be cast.1 94

at http://electionlawblog.org/9p=64964, archived at http://perma.cc/YU4W-PW67.
189 Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate
Compact, 6 ELECTION L. J. 372, 375 (2007).
'90 Nate Silver, Would Al Gore Have Won in 2000 Without the Electoral College?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sep. 20, 2011), available at http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/
archived
2011/09/20/would-al-gore-have-won-in-2000-without-the-electoral-college/?_r=0,
at http://perma.cc/AGP7-RWU2.
'9' 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); see also Landmark Cases: Bush v. Gore (2000),
PBS, available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/futurellandmarkbush.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/3TGA-P4X7.
192
Muller, supra note 189, at 374.
1s Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
194

id.
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The 2000 election also caused dissatisfaction and a desire to
have the election determined by the national popular vote. In
light of the difficulties of amending the Constitution, several
states have passed legislation called the "National Popular Vote
Compact," which would lead to the same result without actually
amending the Constitution.1 95 This Compact provides that a
state's electors would vote for the winner of the national popular
vote instead of the winner of the popular vote within the state.
This Compact, which so far been passed by ten states and the
District of Columbia, will become effective if enough states pass
it. After that point, each of the compacting state's electors would
vote for the winner of the national popular vote, even if that
candidate did not win their state's popular vote. The great irony
of this Compact is that the power of the states to cast their vote
for the winner of the national popular vote is evidenced by and
may be authorized as constitutional by the same Supreme Court
opinion, as well as the concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, which led to a popular vote winner losing
the election. 196
A.

The Electoral College Dysfunction and the Constitution

The relevant constitutional provision at issue in both the
Electoral College and Bush v. Gore is Article II, Section 1,
Clause 2.197 This clause reserves to the states, specifically the
state legislatures, the power to choose the President and Vice
President. 9 8 The state legislature determines how their state
electors vote for the President and Vice President; one option is
a popular vote. The Constitution does not prevent a state from
See Muller, supra note 189, at 375-76.
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104, 113 (finding the State Legislature has
plenary power
to appoint their electors).
197 See US CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 2; Bush, 531 U.S. at 102.
198 US CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 2. The Electoral College was a compromise developed by
the Framers to ensure a form of equality between the states regardless of size: for
example, by giving each state two Senators regardless of their respective populations,
and then having a separate house of the legislature based on population. Tara Ross
Robert M. Hardaway, The Compact Clause and National Popular Vote: Implicationsfor
the 'ederal Structure", 44 N.M. L. REV. 383, 390 (2014). The Framers followed the same
compromise in deciding how to choose the President; each state would have two electors
and then additional electors based on their populations. Id. The system developed largely
in response to slavery, for if slaves were counted as part of the population the power of
the slaves States would increase at the expense of the non-slave States and vice versa.
Charles S. Doskow & David A. Sonner, Vox Populi Is It Time to Reform the Electoral
College?, 55 FED. LAw., 33, 34 (July 2008).
195

&

196
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abolishing its citizens' popular vote for president; indeed, the
Framers of the Constitution determined that the people would
not vote for president, except if the individual state's legislature
enacted a popular vote. 199 The Constitution grants the state
legislature this decision, and shortly after ratification the people
of the several states determined, through their legislators, that
the people should have the right to cast their vote
for president. 200

The Founders decided that the number of electors in each
state should correspond to their representation in the federal
congress, and that each state legislature would be free to
determine its own method of choosing electors. 201 In addition,
the Twenty-third Amendment to the Constitution granted the
District of Columbia the same right to appoint electors for
President, with the same number of electors as Senators and
Representatives that they would have if it was a state. 202 The
District is limited, however, to having no more electors than the
least populous state. 203 While the number of the state's electors
is equivalent to the number of the state's federal
representatives, it is important to note that they are different
and distinct from the federal representatives whom have a
different role in deciding the president. The state first counts its
popular vote, which is then used by the state-determined
electors to cast their electoral vote for president. The Secretary
of the State then transmits the electoral votes to the president
pro tempore of the federal Senate, who subsequently tallies
them and announces the president and vice president elect. 204
Having granted the citizens of their states the ability to cast
their vote, the states are still bound by the Constitution to have
their electors officially cast their vote. 205 The states are free,
199
Bush, 531 U.S. at 104. The Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution in
contrast provides for direct election of Senators, while permitting the State Executive to
fill vacancies that may arise. See U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
1, 11 (1892). States began having popular
200 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S.
elections in the early 1800's and the final two States to appoint their electors were
Florida in 1868 and Colorado in 1876. See Doskow, supra note 198, at 37.
201
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
202
Id.
203

Id.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (providing how the electoral votes shall be counted
and that in the event of an electoral tie the House of Representatives chooses the
President and the Senate chooses the Vice President).
205
See 3 U.S.C.A. §7; 3 U.S.C.A. §8.
204
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however, to determine the way in which its electors shall vote
and its connection to the states popular vote. 206 In doing so, the
states are bound by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the differential
treatment of votes based on voter identity. 207 Moreover, the
states may determine that their electors shall base their
decision on something besides their citizens' votes: for example,
their own political opinion of what is best for the state or
the nation. 208
Forty-eight states, as well as the District of Columbia, have
developed a "winner take all" system, whereby the electors of
the state unanimously vote for the candidate who won the
state's popular vote, or what we will call the "intra-state"
popular vote. 209 Maine and Nebraska, however, are the
exceptions to this rule. Their electors cast only two of their votes
for the intra-state popular winner, and the remaining electors
vote for the popular vote winner of individual districts, or the
intra-district popular vote winner. 210
The Electoral College system, combined with the
unanticipated factions of political parties, has created many
eccentricities, widespread dissatisfaction, and a decreased
interest in voting. A Republican in New York or Democrat in
Texas may have little incentive to vote for the president because
they cannot win the intra-state vote and therefore their electors
will not vote for their candidate. Perhaps an even greater
national dissatisfaction exists with the creation of the
"battleground states." 211 Candidates develop Electoral College
strategies by focusing on states with both sufficient electoral

See Blacker, 146 U.S. at 41. Assuming, of course, the State Legislature
authorizes
such a vote. However, this statement is the general holding of the case.
207 Bush, 531 U.S.
at 104-05.
208 It may not be entirely clear that once the State does
grant their citizens the right
to vote that they are not permitted to determine the election on something else despite
the Legislature providing so in a law prior to the election, it at least as not been
addressed.
209 Ronak Patel, Chapter 188: Forget College, You're
Popular! A Review of the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 43 McGEORGE L. REV. 645, 647 (2012);
Doskow, supra note 198, at 37.
210 Patel, supra note 209, at 647. It should also be noted that there is nothing
preventing a "faithless electors," or an elector who does not cast his vote in accord with
the State rule, indeed there have been nine such electors, although none has changed the
result of an election. Id.
211
id.
206
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votes to win and states where they can win the majority of its
citizen's vote in the intra-state popular vote, thereby gaining all
the state's electoral votes.2 12 Democrats will spend little time or
money in Texas, and Republicans will spend little time or money
in New York because they are pre-determined to elect one
parties' candidate over another. This has resulted in increased
campaigning and interest in a relatively few states, the
battleground states, because these few states are not predetermined they are the true players in the election game. 213
One example of the Electoral Colleges' eccentricities is what
took place in Michigan in the 1890's. In McPherson v. Blacker,214
the Supreme Court took up a challenge to Michigan's districting
system. Democrats had taken temporary control of the state
legislature, and in an effort to win some electoral votes for a
Democratic Presidential candidate, the legislature adopted a
districting system as opposed to the "winner take all" system. 215
The electoral votes would no longer all go to the Republican
nominee and instead the Democratic nominee would win some of
Michigan's electoral votes. 216 The Supreme Court upheld the
districting system as part of the state legislature's "plenary"
power over its electors, thus allowing a "winner take all" system
or some other districting mechanism. 217 At the time, all of the
states had long adopted the "winner take all" system, and thus it
was a rare event when an alternative method was used. 218 For
example, shortly after Colorado entered the Union in 1876, the
state legislature chose the electors for President, directly saving
the expense and trouble of another election. 2 19 The Democratic
Party's victory in the State Legislature was short lived, however,
because the Republican Party shortly regained power in the
state legislature and re-adopted a "winner take all" system,
thereby winning all the electoral votes for their candidate. 220
212
Robert W. Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without A Constitutional
Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 241, 244 (2001).
213
Patel, supra note 209, at 647; Silver, supra note 190.
214
146 U.S. 1 (1892).
215
Doskow, supra note 198, at 34.
216

id.
Blacker, 146 U.S. at 26 (1892). Importantly the Court also found that question to
be a cognizable judicial question and not a non-judicial political question. Id. at 23-24.
218
See id. at 8-11.
219
Id. at 9-10.
220
Doskow, supra note 198, at 34. Needless to say this is a perfectly constitutional
217
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Maine and Nebraska are the current technical exceptions to
the "winner take all" rule; however, due to their popular vote,
their electors have all been unanimous. 221 These are "technical"
exceptions because all their elections have been electoral
"sweeps," except for Nebraska in the 2008 election where
Senator McCain won four electoral votes and President Obama
received one. 2 2 2 The vast majority of states have adopted this
"winner take all" system in an implicit attempt to win as much
influence as possible in the national election. 223 Political parties
do not want to lose the election-not to mention their national
influence-by allowing some of the electors in their territory to
vote for the opposition and then lose the election by that margin.
As a result of the current system, the presidential election in
2000 was determined in effect by a few voters in a few counties
in Florida. The national popular vote was close; but the people of
Georgia are unlikely to be inspired to vote or have an increased
interest in voting if the people believe that only their southern
neighbors have the power to decide the presidency. Therefore, a
system where the president was elected based on the national
popular vote could potentially increase voting, as well as
interest and satisfaction in voting, in all states as opposed to
those few battlegrounds. 224
While there are many dissatisfied citizens who may want a
national popular vote operating under the principle of "one
person, one vote," 2 2 5 there is little chance of amending the
Constitution in this way. Thus, the American people are forced
to work within the Electoral College system to effectuate the
same result. The Constitution has granted individual state
legislatures wide discretion, even "plenary power," in arranging

outcome, if not one designed to, in some respects, disenfranchise the State's own
minority voters as well to compete with the influence of other State electors when
counted by the Senate.
221
Maine & Nebraska, Fair Vote, available at http: //www.fairvote.org/reforms/
national-popular-vote/the-electoral-college/solutions-and-the-case-for-reform/mainenebraska, archived at http://perma.cc/322Y-ZL9B (last visited September 20, 2014).
222

Id.

Craig J. Herbst, Note, Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the
Electoral
College with the District-PopularPlan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 230-36 (2012).
224 Hendrik Hertzberg, National Popular Vote:
New York State Climbs Aboard, THE
NEW YORKER (April 16, 2014).
225 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-07 (finding
it inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause for a State by arbitrary and disparate means to value one person's vote over
another's as it is hostile to our notion of government).
223
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how their electors will vote. 2 2 6 State legislatures may decide that
the national popular vote winner would receive their electoral
votes, thereby accomplishing the same goal without an arduous
constitutional amendment process. States have been unwilling
to do so without support from other states, because in the event
the national popular vote winner is not the same candidate as
an intra-state popular vote winner, then that state's electors
would vote for a candidate whom their citizens had opposed. 227
The states would do so without any guarantee that the opposite
would happen where they would benefit by having another state
vote for their preferred candidate. The party in control of the
state would effectively be ceding their power and influence to
other states. 228 This idea of a "unilateral disarmament" presents
a "prisoner's dilemma" to the states, ultimately preventing an
individual state from devaluing their votes when other states
have not followed suit. 2 2 9 The solution to both the "prisoner's
dilemma" and the national popular vote movement is for the
states to communicate and work together for the common good
or general welfare. In working together, by enacting this
compact, and perhaps by eventually setting up more uniform
systems for recounts, the states embrace the motivations behind

Id. Indeed there is some debate over whether such state laws are subject to
gubernatorial veto, for even though as a matter of state law the Governor may veto any
proposed bill, the Constitution, as a matter of Federal power, reserves the power
specifically to the state legislatures. The Constitution also reserves ratifying
constitutional amendments, and appointing prior to the Seventeenth Amendment
appointing senators. Doskow, supra note 198, at 36. The Supreme Court in Leser v.
Garnet, found that ratifying an Amendment is a federal function, derived from the
Federal Constitution transcending limitations imposed by the State or the people of the
state. Leser v. Garnet, 258 U.S. 130 (1922). In addition, in Bush, the concurring Justices
found it was the State Legislature that determines the election process, and the state
court interpreting that state law was due less deference then would otherwise be
required under the Erie doctrine and principles of federalism. Bush, 531 U.S. 112-14
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
227 Muller, supra note 189, at 374-76.
228
Ultimately a state agreeing to the National Popular Vote Compact is requiring
the same result, they will vote against the will of their citizens for the will of the nation's
citizens. See id. In the compact however, they are gaining the possibility that other
states will vote with them when their intra-state popular vote corresponds with the
national popular vote. More fundamentally, however, as discussed herein the States are
expressing that as a policy matter the Electoral College is flawed and by altering it in
this manner they are making their citizens' votes matter and as important as the
citizens in Miami-Dade County, Florida. See Hertzberg, supra note 224. As shown, the
national popular vote winner has only lost four times, while their citizens might lose
every election because they are not a battleground State. Id.
229 Muller, supra note 189, at
375.
226
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the Constitutional Convention arising from the failures and infighting between states under the Articles of Confederation. 2 30
B.

The Compact and Its Challenges

On April 15, 2014, New York became the most recent State
to pass the National Popular Vote Compact (NPVC or
Compact). 231 The National Popular Vote Compact is the
proposed alternative to amending the U.S. Constitution and still
ensures the winner of the popular vote will be elected
President. 232 Under the Compact, the compacting states' electors
would vote for the winner of the national popular vote as
opposed to the intra-state popular vote winner. 233 There are now
ten states, along with the District of Columbia, that have passed
the NPVC. 2 34 With New York's twenty-nine electoral votes the
compact has the support of 165 electoral votes. 235 While these
states have passed the Compact, it is not actually in effect until
enough states enact it in "substantially the same form" to bring
the total number of compacting electoral votes to 270.236 This
guarantees that the national popular vote determines the
election and therefore the individual states do not need to
"unilaterally disarm" themselves. 2 37 The Compact has currently
reached 61.1% of the required 270 electoral votes to implement
its provisions and control the outcome of the presidency. 238
When enacting the Compact, withdrawing from the
Compact, or when the Compact takes effect, the chief executive
member of each state must promptly notify the chief executives
230 See id. at 377-80. However, creating this
state Compact might be precisely why
interstate compacts require Congressional approval in order to have a federal authority
to resolve state disputes. See Mathew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts Require
CongressionalConsent?, 42 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 514 (2009).
231 Hertzberg, supra note 224.
232 See Pincus, supra note 230, at 512-13.
233 See
id.
234 Hertzberg, supra note 224.
2 Id.
236

Id.

See Muller, supra note 189, at 375-76.
Some scholars have argued that the Compact may reach the intended result
without that many electoral votes. See id.; Jennings Wilson, Bloc Voting in the Electoral
College: How the Ignored States Can Become Relevant and Implement PopularElection
Along the Way, 5 ELECTION L.J. 384, 385 (2006). A few States banding together may in
fact be enough, and having States using it now may encourage other States who see the
results to also join.
237

238
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of the other states. Any state may withdraw from the
agreement, except within six months of a presidential
election. 239 Each state makes its own final determination for the
number of popular votes cast in the state and must
communicate such number to the other states within twentyfour hours. In addition, the state must "immediately release to
the public all vote counts or statements of votes as they are
determined or obtained," and each state must treat the other
states' intra-state popular vote winner as conclusive. 240
At two pages, the NPVC is wonderful in its simplicity and
purpose, but as such it is susceptible to several objections.2 4 1 The
Compact does not provide for recounts, instead leaving it to the
several states.242 The Compact does not arrange for any
oversight in confirming counts, uniformity in voting standards,
uniformity in voter qualifications, 243 preventing fraud, or a
uniform system for recounts and challenges. 244 Of course, this
arrangement is no change from the current system, which
already leaves it to the independent several states. 2 4 5

The six month rule might not pass constitutional muster because the
State
Legislature cannot abdicate their constitutional duties. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104. Once the
people have voted the State cannot then take away that ability, such would be a
deprivation of Due Process, unless the law provided certain scenarios like the instant
one. Cf. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994) (finding Due Process requires a State to
provide the remedy it has promised, in that context once the State promised post
deprivation remedy for collecting taxes the State cannot take away that remedy after
taking the taxes, it's an obligation arising from the Constitution itself). For instance in
Bush, the problem was "voters went to the polls in Florida in 2000 with Procedure A in
place; after the election, Procedure B was instituted. That, to the per curiam majority,
was the fundamental problem." Jonathan H. Adler, Sixth Circuit Upholds Injunction
Against Ohio's Voting Law Changes, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 25, 2014),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/25/
sixth-circuit-upholds-injunction-against-ohios-voting-law-changes/, archived at http: //
perma.ccN93B-MNMH. The question is where that line is: how far before the election
can the Legislature change the law? In September of 2014 the Supreme Court issued a
stay to a lower court's order providing that polls be opened for more days than the state
leaders had planned; however, there would still be several weeks of voting in Ohio. Lyle
Denniston, Early Voting in Ohio Blocked (updated), SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 29, 2014),
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/09/early-voting-in-ohio-blocked/, archived at
http://perma.cc/CAV4-FE9K.
240 N.Y. Elec. Law § 12-402 (McKinney).
241
See id.
242
Gail Dryden and Barbara Klein, LWVUS National Popular Vote Compact
Study,
Opposing Arguments, League of Women Voters 4 (2008), available at
http://lwvodc.org/files/npvargument con.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7CXR-9YMU.
243
Discussed briefly supraat note 224 and accompanying text.
244 See N.Y. Elec. Law § 12-402 (McKinney)
245
See Dryden & Klein, supranote 242, at 5.
239
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The NPVC also cannot alter how compacting states, or noncompacting states for that matter, conduct their elections, or the
potential for non-compacting states to frustrate the Compact in
various ways. 2 46 The non-compacting states have the ability to
simply refuse to make their intra-state popular election results
known, or known in time for the compacting state's electors to
vote accordingly. 247 Additionally, the states may change their
voter qualifications to increase their voting power. A Compact
that attempts to address these issues may prove impossible to
pass, but these concerns do not currently present themselves. 248
In the event such an issue arises, the states are capable of
withdrawing from the Compact or adapting to it through further
negotiation. The elegance of the Compact is its fluidity and
adaptability, as compared to an amendment which may very
well need to address all these concerns and countless other
practicalities. An amendment would have to explicitly
memorialize such issues as voter qualifications, registration,
and early voting or provide for a radical shift in authority from
the individual states to the United States.
One concern opponents of the Compact have involves its
shift in power. The Constitutional Convention created the
Electoral College system out of a fear that a national popular
vote would lead to the more populous states having more power
than the smaller states and being able to take political
advantage. 249 Those who oppose the Compact opine that under a
national popular vote the candidates would focus on the cities
and other dense population centers. 250 This is as opposed to the
current system as discussed which focuses on those few counties
in Florida and other current battleground states. The solution in
the Compact is the same "one person, one vote" protection in
intra-state elections. All voters are franchised under the
Compact, thereby encouraging voters in Maine just as much as

246 For a list and discussion of such possibilities
see Norman R. Williams, Reforming
the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism,and the Perils of Subconstitutional
Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173, 209 (2011).
241 See Daniel P. Rathbun, Ideological Endowment:
the Staying Power of the
Electoral College and the Weaknesses of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact,

106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 117, 119 (2008).

These same problems would have to be addressed in attempting
to change the
Electoral College by constitutional amendment.
249 See Ross & Hardaway, supra note 198,
at 388-91.
248

250

Id. at 395.
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voters in Wyoming. The truth is that only four times in the
nation's history has the national popular vote winner lost the
election and so such a change will rarely alter the final outcome
per se. A popular vote is unlikely to change elections or power
among the states; it will hopefully change voter turnout and
interest. 251 The NPVC thereby encourages the entire electorate
in all states and from all political parties to exercise their right
252
to vote because no matter where they live, their vote matters.
As a policy matter, it must also be asked that if do
candidates do focus on a high population density area, is a
negative change, or just a change in the status quo? In addition,
will candidates really neglect a state as high in density as Ohio?
The candidate will not want to lose a voter in Maine because
that voter is as important as the voter in Ohio. Moreover, the
eleven states that have joined the Compact are equally divided
between large, small, and medium sized states. 253 Perhaps this
expresses that as a policy matter all states would do better
under this system, because their votes would be sought after.
The states for whom this Compact would be "bad" are those
254
battleground states who currently receive all the attention.
Under the NPVC the battleground states would receive the
same attention as the other states, and therefore relatively less
2 55
attention than they presently receive.
The states that have passed the NPVC are largely those
who are ignored and never see the nominees or their television
ads. 2 5 6 The presidential nominees are happy to take their
money, only to then funnel it to those lucky few battleground

See Hertzberg, supra note 224.
See Heather Green, The National Popular Vote Compact: Horizontal Federalism
and the Proper Role of Congress Under the Compact Clause, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 211, 217
(2012).
252 For the large States there are New York, California, New Jersey, and Illinois; for
the medium there are Maryland, Washington, and Massachusetts; and for the small
there are Rhode Island, Vermont, Hawaii, and the smallest-the District of Columbia.
254
See Green, supra note 252, at 225-27.
255
Id.
256
At present all the compacting States are considered "blue" States and a foregone
conclusion for the Democratic party; however, this might be due to the Democrats feeling
particularly rebuffed in the Bush election and Republican politicians suspicion that the
Compact is therefore being utilized to gain political power of those States who disagreed
with the Republicans winning the election without winning the popular vote. Hertzberg,
National PopularVote: New York State Climbs Aboard, supra note 224. Notwithstanding
that opinion the Republican rank-and-filers strongly favor the idea of popular election.
Id.
251
252
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states, and people in the non-battleground states are ignored
and disadvantaged. The politicians in those non-battleground
states, no matter their party, are equally ignored. 257 These
compacting states have determined that the current system
is untenable.
Whereas the previous objections and concerns are mainly
policy-based, there are two potential constitutional hurdles to
the Compact. The text of Article II, as well as the Supreme
Court's interpretation of it, indicate that state legislatures have
plenary power to determine how their electors' vote; however,
there may be some limits to that power. One scholar, for
example, has argued that the history of the relevant
constitutional provision and its wide-spread use by state
legislatures reveal that the states may not base their elections
on election results outside their states. 258 This seems to
contradict recent precedent permitting "plenary authority;" but
if the argument is expounded upon, can the state legislature
consider a vote in England, or Iran, or on the Internet in
determining how their electors vote?
Perhaps such an argument creates a straw man or expands
it to an absurdity, and so is objectionable on that basis. The
point is while the state's power is plenary, that does not mean or
cannot mean the states may be irrational or absurd. 259 Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Bush, while upholding the
257

Hertzberg, supra note 224.
See Norman R. Williams,

Why the National Popular Vote Compact Is
Unconstitutional, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1523, 1540 (2012).
It is not as far-fetched to imagine, outside the Compact discussion, that a State
259
may authorize non-citizens, or younger citizens, within the State to vote. Norman R.
Williams, Reforming the Electoral College, supra note 246, at 230. This authorization
might not be objectionable either to many people or to the State's citizens, but it may be
highly contentious, to say the least, in current national politics. The national
government may regulate time, place, and manner of Federal elections, but have no
power in who may vote in the election. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013) (quoting FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (A. Hamilton)) (finding
that the States have authority to determine who may vote in federal elections because a
Congress who can control the qualifications of its own electorate could by degrees
subvert the Constitution). Although, the Civil War Amendments recognize that the
States may be as abusive or tyrannical as the Federal government and provided the
federal government with the "sweeping new enforcement powers" against the States. See
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2637, (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
258

(quoting A. AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 361, 363, 399 (2005)). Such

discussions may properly be reserved for another day and perhaps when a State actually
makes such a proposal to extend the right to vote beyond uniformly accepted practices in
the rest of the states. Indeed this might benefit the Compact because it is more flexible
then a constitutional amendment.
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legislature's plenary power, found: "[t]he importance of [the
Presidential] election and the vital character of its relationship
to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people
cannot be too strongly stated." 260 State control can "implicate a
uniquely important national interest," for what is more
important than the "only elected officials who represents all the
voters in the Nation."2 6 1
While a State may have plenary power, it seems that there
may be an upper limit to that discretion. The rationale behind
that upper limit is not implicated when the election is based on
a national popular vote. As Chief Justice Rehnquist found, the
president represents all the voters in the nation, and the welfare
of the people as a whole is immensely important. 262 When the
people of the United States, as a whole, have the power to so
choose, then the Chief Justice's concern that the president
represents the entire nation is satisfied; indeed, the Compact
seems to reflect the Chief Justice's principle.
The values underpinning the Voting Rights Act may also be
implicated in this Compact, in ensuring an open, free, and fair
election. 263 In order to make the Compact effective, Congress
may have to use that authority to overcome any state
obfuscation. Congress may also have an even bigger role in this
"Compact." If this is indeed a "Compact," under the
Constitution, Congress has to consent to any state "enter[ing]
into any Agreement or Compact with another state." 2 6 4 Whether
the Compact Clause invalidates how a state chooses to use their
plenary power to choose their electors under Article II is
unclear.
this
Clause jurisprudence,
Under current Compact
"Compact" probably does not require Congressional approval.
First, the categorical language of Article I indicates the plenary
power of the states to determine their electors. 265 This
"Compact" may just be parallel legislation among the states
directing how their electors vote under certain conditions or
Bush, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring) (quoting Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934)).
261
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983)).
262
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J. concurring) (quoting Burroughs, 290
U.S. at 545).
263 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at
2636.
264 U.S. CONST. art. I §10
cl 3.
265
See Bush, 531 U.S. 98 at 104.
26
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voting results. 266 "The prohibition is directed to the formation of
any combination tending to the increase of political power in the
States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States." 2 6 7

The Compact Clause requires those compacts that "interfere
with either federal or non-compacting state sovereignty
interests-to receive congressional approval." 268 The NPVC does
not implicate federal sovereignty interests, as it would not
undermine the power of the federal government by having the
totality of the people elect its executive. 269 The NPVC, however,
may face challenges under the interests of the non-compacting
states

analysis

prong. 2 7 0

The

failures

of

the

Articles

of

Confederation in preventing state infighting created the need for
a strong national government with the power to prevent state
factions. 271 The fear was that a few states joining together could
do great damage to non-compacting states by creating
"divergent allegiances." 272
The NPVC may be a compact that requires congressional
approval under the Constitution if it affects the interests of noncompacting states by enhancing the political power of the
compacting states at the expense of the other states. 273 The
NPVC, however, as discussed above, does not enhance the
political power of the compacting states; it takes into account
the votes of all the states including the non-compacting states. 274
The Compact shifts power to the nation's people as a whole as
opposed to a particular battlefield state. In addition, the

See Robert W. Bennett, State Coordinationin Popular Election of the President
without a ConstitutionalAmendment, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2002). But see Derek T.
Muller, More Thoughts on the Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote: A
Response to Professor Hendricks, 7 ELECTION L.J. 227, 232 (2008).
261 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519
(1893).
268 See Muller, More Thoughts on the Compact Clause, supra note
266, at 232.
269 Green, supra note 252, at 222-25; contra Ross & Hardway,
supra note 198, at 428
(arguing against this position because the NPVC alters the constitutional structure in a
manner that could only be possible by a constitutional amendment, which would require
Congressional approval and undermine the amendment process).
270 See Ross & Hardway, supra note 198, at 428.
271 See id. at 385-87.
272 David E. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate
Arrangements: When is a
Compact Not a Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63, 79 (1965).
272 See Green, supra note 252, at
224-31.
274 See id. at 225-27 (arguing the NPVC shifts power
from the battleground States
to the safe States, or the compacting States).
266
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candidates pay attention to the elected officials in all states, not
just the current swing states. 275
The NPVC does not change the electoral votes, influence, or
representation of non-compacting states in the Congress. There
is no argument that the Compact grants the compacting states
additional power because it does not make them the new
battleground states, even if there is a change in influence from
the battleground states to the people as a whole. Furthermore,
clearly the Compact does not increase the power of the populous
states to the disadvantage of the smaller states, as the Framers
feared when the Electoral College system was designed. 276 In
addition, much has changed since that system was designed
including an increase in the power and importance of the federal
government, a constitutional amendment providing for direct
election of senators, and every state allowing a popular vote
for president.
The compacting states would have the electoral votes to
control any election; however, they have not compacted to
consider only the wishes of the compacting states, but the whole
nation. The Compact provides that the President is the only
official representing the nation as a whole to actually be elected
by the entire nation by popular vote. Moreover, as discussed
above, just one non-compacting state can frustrate the Compact
in various ways. Should a non-compacting state determine its
influence is diminished, it is within that state's sole power to
277
frustrate the Compact.
While the NPVC may be called a "Compact," the states are
completely free to unilaterally withdraw or repeal it.278 The
NPVC itself requires that a state cannot withdraw six months
before the election but, as discussed above, such a limitation
may violate Article II's mandate that the state legislature have
plenary control over their electors, and that power cannot be
abdicated. 279 The NPVC further provides that should one
provision be invalid, the remaining will be upheld, and of course
Hertzberg, National Popular Vote, supra note 224.
Cf. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate
Compact, supra note 189.
277
See Norman R. Williams, supranote 246, at 209.
278 See Ross & Hardway, supra note 198, at 422-26 (citing Supreme Court precedent
for the proposition that a State's ability to freely withdraw from an agreement is an
important factor to find that congressional approval is not required).
219 See Green, supra note 252, at 215.
275

276
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should one provision fall the states always have the ability to
repeal it.280
An additional question arises if the Supreme Court
determines that this is in fact a Compact under the
Constitution, and it does not receive Congressional consent: does
the Court have the power to enjoin it? In Bush, the Court did not
interfere with Florida's control over its electors; the Court
determined that Florida Supreme Court's recount violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 281 Therefore, the Court enjoined the
recount but did not interfere with the State's Article II power
over its electors, instead upholding the original count. 282 Would
the Court then determine that the states would have to cast
their electors as they would without the Compact, or would the
Court go to the level of commanding or commandeering how the
compacting states cast their Electoral College votes?
The Compact is an elegant solution to enable the popular
election of the President without ceding control of elections to
the federal government. The NPVC works within the Electoral
College system as constitutionally required and the federalist
system where the states exist in a sphere of sovereignty apart
from the federal government. 283 The weakness of the NPVC may
be its success, in that the NPVC works within the Electoral
College, leaving it to the desire of the states to evaluate and reevaluate the solution in changing circumstances. Should a
national popular vote system fail or prove undesirable, there
would not need to be another constitutional amendment to
reinstate the Electoral College system or create some
alternative. The states still have the power to withdraw, and
more than that they have the ability to adapt and work together
in a way the Constitution envisioned out of the failures of the
Articles of Confederation, while enfranchising the electorate.
IV. THE BLUE SLIP TRADITION
As the third branch of government, the Judiciary plays an
important and active role in every aspect of government, policy,
and the daily lives of Americans. The importance of the Supreme
See N.Y. Elec. Law § 12-402 (McKinney).
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103.
282 See id. at 109-11
283 See Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact Is Unconstitutional,
supra
note 259, at 1525.
280
281
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Court of the United States in shaping law, rights, and the
nature and power of the federal government and the several
States cannot be understated. The most heated political
questions may first be played out in the political sphere of the
legislatures and executive branches, but when a legislature
passes a law regarding anything from campaign finance to
abortion, it is understood that it may ultimately be decided by
the judiciary and, eventually, the nine justices of the Supreme
Court. The people therefore, have as strong an interest in who
these nine Justices are as they do for their elected officials, but
they are unable to vote for them. Instead, the people may vote
for the officials who will appoint justices with a desired ideology.
The purpose of this paper has been to examine how well election
law serves the electorate, and this section follows that same
theme but approaches it from a slightly different angle. This
section asks how well the laws and procedures of judicial
appointments serves the electorate, as the unelected judiciary is
just as influential as the elected branches of government.
The political desire to appoint Supreme Court justices and
the confrontational obfuscation in the Senate is perhaps widely
known, especially in the nominations starting with and
following the failed appointment of Judge Bork to the Supreme
Court. 28 4 The nomination of Supreme Court justices is a deeply
divided process that, while not meant to, does ensure that the
party in power puts in a true believer or a justice who will vote
its way on issues ranging from abortion to campaign finance and
to prevent the opposing party from doing the same. 2 8 5 Currently,
this may be best evidenced by strong criticism of Justice Ruth
Obama
Ginsburg for not retiring during the
Bader
administration in order to ensure she is replaced by the
Democratic Party. 286 Under the U.S. Constitution, federal judges
are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate and have life tenure, instead of being elected by the
people to a set term. 287 A president has the ability to leave a
thirty year ideological legacy and continue to have their policies
284
The Honorable Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How
Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 691, 700-01 (2004).
285

Id.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Much Depends on Ginsburg, LA TIMES (March 15, 2014),
available at http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinsky-ginsburg-shouldresign-20140316-story.html#axzz2wTKISC3d, archived at http://perma.cc/2V2C-KYZ8.
287
See U.S. CONST. art. II §2.
2'8
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"irrevocable imbedded in government" through appointing a
particular judge or justice who will continue to decide cases and
controversies for the remainder of the judge's life. 2 8 8
A.

The Power of the Lower Courts

The elected officials also know, perhaps better than the
people, the important role the lower courts play. 289 The vast
majority of controversies that end up going to trial are fully
litigated and resolved by the lower courts, because the Supreme
Court has discretion to hear cases on a writ of certiorari and
only decided seventy-five cases in the October 2013 term.2 90 In
the ordinary course, the Supreme Court takes cases after at
least two lower courts and at least four judges have narrowed
the issues in the particular case and determined the facts of that
controversy. The power of these inferior tribunals greatly
impacts the scope and breadth of any Supreme Court decision,
as well as if there will be any decision at all. 2 9 1 Furthermore,
because the Court takes so few cases, it often takes cases that
multiple inferior courts have already decided, providing the
Court with a lengthy record and a rich background of potential
decisions that it may adopt since the different appellate courts
often reach different conclusions. 292 When a person seeks redress
for an injury or a deprivation of their constitutional rights, it is
the district court judge who hears the case and determines
whether the law entitles the person to a remedy. The circuit
judges then handle the vast majority of appeals, and usually the
Supreme Court takes a case after appellate courts have decided
a particular issue differently. 293 "Circuit courts wield
Id. at 485.
Id. at 489-90.
280 See 2013 Term Opinions of the Court, Supreme
Court of the United States,
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/13, archived at http://
perma.cc/WE5E-3CF8.
291 The Supreme Court's role is primarily to "resolve conflicts
of federal law that
have arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the
Constitution, laws, treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory power over
lower federal courts." Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme
Court: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 273 (2013) (quoting Chief Justice Fred
M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, Address Before the American Bar Association
(Sept. 7, 1949)).
292 See id. at 273-75.
293 See Ryan J. Owens et. al., Ideology, Qualifications,
and Covert Senate Obstruction
of FederalCourt Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 374 (2014).
2"
289
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tremendous power because they rule on nearly every issue
before the federal judiciary and are rarely audited by the
Supreme Court," and therefore play the "greatest legal
policymaking role in the U.S. judicial system." 2 94
Both district court and circuit court judges have tremendous
power to develop the law and have a great impact on the people
within their jurisdiction, providing persuasive precedent for
judges in neighboring jurisdictions. Many litigants who enter
the court system never have their case decided by a higher judge
and rely on the district court or the circuit court for a final
disposition of their rights. 295 Therefore, any vacancy on these
lower courts may impede and obstruct the people when they
have been injured in some manner and seek redress. At present
there are fifty-four vacancies in the judiciary, or around a ten
percent vacancy percentage. 296
Although federal judges are not elected, the people have
some influence in their appointments through the election of
their elected representatives. The President, who is elected by
the whole nation, nominates a candidate to the bench while the
Senate, also elected by the people, investigates and then
conducts an up or down confirmation vote. 29 7 The government
has a strong incentive to ensure a fully staffed judiciary; as
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "the Senate is surely under no
obligation to confirm any particular nominee, but after the
necessary time for inquiry, it should vote him up or down ...
vacancies cannot remain at such high levels indefinitely without
eroding the quality of justice." 298
Around the time of the Chief Justice's comments, President
Clinton was in office facing challenges to many of his
appointments, and when he left office forty-two of his nominees
were unconfirmed, most without a hearing, and with nearly one
Id. at 374.
See Seymour, supra note 284, at 702
296
Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, New Wars of Advice and Consent: Judicial
Selection in the Obama Years, 97 JUDICATURE 48, 49 (2013); Judicial Vacancies, US
Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies
.aspx.
See U.S. CONST. art. II §2; see also Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice
29'
and Consent During the Bush Years: The Politics of Confirming Federal Judges, 92
294

295

JUDICATURE 320, 324 (2009).
29" Binder & Maltzman, New Wars of Advice and Consent, supra note 296, at 48
(quoting Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, December 31, 1997).
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hundred vacancies on the federal bench. 299 Should the Senate
not want to confirm a nominee they may simply cast a negative
or down vote; however, there is yet another procedure, the "blue
slip" that they may use.
B.

The Blue Slip Courtesy

The blue slip is a procedure of the Senate Judiciary
Committee that arises out of senatorial courtesy, and not from
the Constitution or any law.3 00 Admittedly, the senators of the

state where the district court sits do have a unique or
heightened interest in that nomination because that judge will
primarily be deciding their citizens' rights and the validity of
their state and local laws.3 0 1 The impact of the district judge is
much greater on the state in which the judge sits than elsewhere
because that court will hear challenges to state laws and state
action from Section 1983 suits to petitions for habeas corpus.
The blue slip procedure is designed to extend these senators a
courtesy by receiving their individual input in the appointment
process. 302 The senators also have an interest in the circuit court
judges that review district courts within the state's territory
because they will handle the appeals concerning their people
and their state's laws. The blue slip procedure also applies to
appointing these appellate judges, because by tradition each
state in a circuit has at least one seat, where that particular
seat is reserved for a judge from that state.303 As a courtesy, this
system functions appropriately by taking into account the views
of those who will be most directly affected, as it most directly
concerns that Senator's home state.
Some also suggest the courtesy enables an "early warning
system" to help avoid certain embarrassing and acrimonious
controversies. 3 0 4 The blue slip, as a senatorial courtesy, might
encourage the President to work more closely with the Senate
and individual Senators on the appointment procedure, but it
Seymour, supra note 284, at 702.
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301 See generally Tuan Samahon, Federal Judicial Selection and the Senate's Blue
Slip "Tradition", 20 NEV. LAW 11 (2012).
302 Id.
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might also lead to the opposite result. The procedure where the
blue slip acts as a "silent veto" of the president's nominee may
instead lead to increased animosity and partisanship between
the parties. 305 The question then becomes: when does this
courtesy go too far and grant a single Senator, or pair of
Senators, such authority that is constitutionally delegated to
the President?
The precise extent of this procedure changes with each
committee, however, the basic procedure remains the same.
After the President sends a name to the Senate for a district
court, the committee sends a blue slip to the Senators from the
state in which that district court is located. 306 The courtesy and
the blue slip tradition arises when the Senators fail to return
the blue slip to the committee, which results in a silent veto
where the nomination proceeds no further, without a hearing or
an up or down vote.30 7

C.

The Blue Slip as a Silent Veto

The strength of this denial varies depending on the times
and the Senate; however, at its strongest the Senate may use
the blue slip procedure as a complete veto of a nomination before
any other vote or inquiry while at other times it may just slow
down the process for more investigation. At times, both home
state Senators must support the nominee in order for the
appointment process to continue. 308 Ordinarily, the President
needs to nominate a candidate who he believes will receive a
majority of votes in the Senate; however, as shown under this
strong version where the blue slip acts as a complete and silent
veto, a single Senator can veto a presidential nominee.309
Moreover, even one Senator, elected by a limited number of
people, acting alone may take on the power of the President,
who is elected by the whole union. This blue slip power may
enable one Senator to effectively nominate his own federal
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judge. 310 The President then may not simply choose a candidate
who will receive a majority vote. Instead the President must
consult with, and convince, the two Senators of that state to
allow his nominee to go forward, and often this ability enables
the Senators to advise the President to nominate their own
preferred candidate. 11 Moreover, even after the blue slips are
returned the chairman of the committee can simply decide not to
schedule or conduct a hearing, thereby permanently evading
the nomination. 3 12
The strong version of this blue slipping courtesy, or this
silent veto, has been rarely utilized since its origin and, "the
approach that simply promotes pre-nomination presidential
consultation with home state senators-has prevailed over twothirds of the time since the blue slip's 1917 debut." 3 1 3 The strong
version of the procedure has often been used in highly partisan
times, including after Brown v. Board of Education,3 14 to keep
the Mississippi District Courts free of Brown sympathizers. 3 15
Historically, the blue slip has most often been found to be a
delaying tactic "which allowed senators to make further inquiry
and to negotiate on the vacancy-the classic use of the blue
slip."316 An examination of recent years, however, may reveal
"the fears of the blue slip's critics have been realized," as it is
increasingly being used as a silent veto. 317
In 2009, Senate Republicans, after losing control of the
presidency and Senate, threatened to block any nominee who
failed to pass muster with key Republican senators. 3 18 Senator
Pat Leahy took notice of this filibuster and decided to uphold the
strong version of the blue slip courtesy. 319 Likewise in 2002,
when the Republicans were in control of the Senate and the
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strong version of the blue slip was not followed, the Democrats
turned to the filibuster in order to block Bush's nominations. 320
In recent years, the strong version of the blue slip has
prevailed. For example, when Senator Arlen Specter was
chairman he required both senators to return the blue slip, and
so has Chairman Leahy during the Bush Presidency. 321 This
strong version of the blue slip unduly enables a single Senator to
take on powers more properly and constitutionally reserved for
the President and the advice and consent of the entire Senate.
The Senator can delay a district or circuit judge from being
appointed to a particular seat, leading to the current crisis of an
understaffed federal Judiciary. As Chief Justices Rehnquist and
Roberts have pointed out, the failure to appoint judges has
unduly delayed cases and prevented the people from an orderly
judicial system to decide their cases. 322 The lower courts are the
first judges to address important issues, as well as the run of the
mill cases of the people, and therefore the district courts are
actively making public policy, determining the rights and
remedies of the people, and deciding complex issues in
323
interpreting both the Constitution and laws on a daily basis.
When a single Senator can interfere with this process and
make it harder for a person to have their injury heard and
redressed, they upset the constitutional framework and harm
the electorate and American people. The problem with the blue
slip in particular is that it is silent; as a Senate procedure, the
nomination simply pauses or stops indefinitely. The qualified
candidate the duly elected President nominates never receives
an up or down vote by the Senators elected by the people, and
the people are often unaware their Senator has acted in such a
manner. A Senator who gives a down vote or engages in a
filibuster has made a public stand that their constituents may
judge them on, and should the public agree that the nominee
was wrong for them, then that Senator will be supported by his
constituents. After proper inquiry, investigation, and hearings a
nominee should face a vote by the national electorate and not
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just one individual segment thereof.324 The crisis the blue slip
creates is not only an understaffed judiciary but it is an
incendiary tool that can lead to one Senator obstructing the
President's power to appoint judges, the elected Senate's power
to confirm the nominee, and increased partisanship.
CONCLUSION

This article has approached the question of whether election
law serves the electorate with a multifaceted approach.
Attempting to remain non-partisan, or perhaps voter-partisan,
this article asserts that through some or all of the proposals
herein, as well as others, we can inch closer to prioritizing, or at
least to treating, as more than an afterthought, the very
electorate that makes the country great.
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